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Abstract 
Designers often improve the performance of artificial agents by specializing them. We can 
make a rough, but useful distinction between specialization to a task and specialization to an 
environment. Specialization to an environment can be difficult to understand: it may be unclear 
on what properties of the environment he agent depends, or in what manner it depends on 
each individual property. In this paper, I discuss a method for analyzing specialization into a 
series of conditional optimizations: formal transformations which, given some constraint on the 
environment, map mechanisms to more efficient mechanisms with equivalent behavior. I apply the 
technique to the analysis of the vision and control systems of a working robot system in day to 
day use in our laboratory. 
The method is not intended as a general theory for automated synthesis of arbitrary specialized 
agents. Nonetheless, it can be used to perform posr-hoc analysis of agents o as to make explicit 
the environment properties required by the agent and the computational value of each property. 
This post-hoc analysis helps explain performance in normal environments and predict performance 
in novel environments. In addition, the transformations brought out in the analysis of one system 
can be reused in the synthesis of future systems. 
1. Introduction 
Scientists and mathematicians seek general principles: individual principles that each 
explain a large class of phenomena. Engineers seek general mechanisms, but are often 
forced for one reason or another to use highly specialized ones. When one needs to 
solve a wide range of problems, it may be more desirable to design a set of specialized 
mechanisms than to pay the price needed to build a single mechanism that can solve all 
problems. 
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Computer science, being a curious combination of engineering and mathematics, often 
pushes both extremes of specialization and generality at once. Theorists and program- 
ming language designers search for ever simpler more compact abstract computing 
machines that are still Turing-equivalent (e.g. the 2-counter Turing machine [ 331 or 
the lambda calculus [ lo,41 ] ). while computer architects search for the best collections 
of specialized circuits with which to emulate the behavior of these general computing 
machines [ 171. Finally, compiler designers search for better methods for automatically 
mapping the general machines into specialized machines [ 31. 
Throughout this paper, I will adopt the somewhat artificial distinction between spe- 
cialization to a task (e.g. navigation vs. car assembly) and to an environment (e.g. 
forests versus highways). Specialization of an agent to a task is no different than the 
specialization of a normal computer program to a task. The designer usually has an 
explicit definition of the task and consciously uses that definition in the design of the 
agent or program. Often the internal structure of the mechanism reflects the internal 
structure of the task, with modules of the mechanism corresponding to subproblems 
of the overall task. (This is not as clear in the case of biological agents, see [ 71.) 
However, it is rare for a designer to have a complete formal description of the behavior 
of her agent’s environment (the exception being simple virtual worlds). In addition, the 
agent’s assumptions about its environment are often not explicitly represented within 
the agent. Such tacit knowledge may be spread diffusely throughout the agent. These 
factors conspire to make specialized agents difficult to understand. 
The fundamental claim of this paper is that environmental specialization can be 
usefully described in terms of transformations over possible agents that provably preserve 
behavior when the agent is situated in some specific type of environment. The issue of 
when specialized mechanisms should be used in the first place is outside the scope of 
the paper. 
2. Example 
Fig. I shows an image of an office taken with a camera mounted on a robot. Suppose 
we want the robot to avoid obstacles by turning left when there is more free space to 
the left and right when there is more free space to the right. To do this, the robot must 
determine which side of the image has more free space. This amounts to the problem 
of finding which regions of the floor are free and which have objects on top of them. 
The problem is difficult because the image projection process loses information, depth 
information in particular, and so we cannot uniquely determine the structure of the scene 
without additional information either in the form of additional images or of additional 
assumptions. 
A common way of solving the problem is to build a complete depth map of the 
scene and then project the features in the depth map into the floor plane. Those parts 
of the floor onto which no features are projected will be free space. A common way of 
building depth maps is to use two cameras in a stereo configuration. Distinctive features 
(usually edges) can be found in the two images and matched to one another. Given the 
matching of the features, we can compute each feature’s shift due to parallax, and from 
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Fig. 1. (Left) Image of an office taken from the robot’s camera. The dots in the lower middle of the image 
are artifacts due to the quantization in the rendering process. The structure in the lower right-hand portion of 
the image is a Hegged office chair. The structures in the top-left are (left to right) a doorway viewed from 
an oblique angle, a small trash can, and a file cabinet. The homogeneous region in the lower and middle left 
is the carpet. (Right) The pixels with significant texture. 
-Lp__ m 
situation image 
Fig. 2. An observer views a cliff of a textureless surface (Left). Although variations in lighting of the two 
sides of the cliff may produce a local variation in image brightness at the point of discontinuity (Right), there 
is still no texture in the image above or below the discontinuity which would allow the observer to infer the 
depth, or even the presence, of the cliff from stereo data. 
that, the 3D positions of the features (see [ 41) . 
The stereo approach, while perfectly reasonable, does have undesirable properties. 
It is computationally expensive, particularly in the matching phase. It may also require 
very high resolution data. A more important problem is that the floor in this environment 
appears textureless from a distance, and so has no features to match. Fig. 1 shows a 
map of the image in which pixels with significant texture (actually, significant intensity 
gradients) are marked in white. The region corresponding to the floor is uniformly 
black. The stereo process cannot make any depth measurements in the most important 
region of the image because there are no features there to be matched. The problem 
can be remedied by interpolating a flat surface in the absence of texture from which to 
compute depth. In that case, the stereo system is working not because it is measuring 
the depth of the floor directly, but because it is making a smoothness assumption that 
happens to be true of floors in office environments. The assumption is not true in the 
general case (see Fig. 2). 
This brings out two important points. First truly general systems are extremely rare, 
and so claims of generality should be considered carefully. Often the mechanisms we 
build have hidden assumptions. These can be particularly difficult to uncover in advance 
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Fig. 3. The carpet blob extracted from Fig. I using the coloring algorithm. Note that the blob is taller where 
there is more exposed carpet. 
because we may unconsciously choose test data that fit them. This is not to say that 
implicit assumptions are bad. Quite the contrary: those assumptions can lead to great im- 
provements in performance. However, we as engineers need to make informed decisions 
about our use of specialization. We need to understand more clearly what assumptions 
our agents make about their environments, and how often those assumptions are true of 
the particular environments in which they operate. 
2. I. A more ejficient algorithm 
The stereo system worked on the scene in Fig. 1 because the floor was flat and the 
obstacles had texture. We can make a different system to solve the problem, one that is 
much more efficient, by using these facts directly and by treating the lack of texture on 
the floor as a useful feature of the environment rather than a problem to be overcome. 
Notice that the floor forms a single, connected black blob at the bottom of Fig. 1. 
This blob is shown alone in Fig. 3. I will call this the carpet blob. The carpet blob 
is easily computed by region coloring: starting at the bottom of the screen, trace up 
each image column, marking pixels until a textured pixel is found in that column. The 
marked pixels will form the blob. The height of the blob varies with the amount of 
exposed floor in the corresponding direction, giving us a rough and ready measure of 
the amount of free space in that direction. 
We can then solve our navigation problem simply by extracting the carpet blob and 
turning in the direction in which the carpet blob is tallest. This technique is the basis of 
the low level navigation capabilities the Polly system [ 18,191, a mobile robot that gives 
simple tours of the AI lab at MIT. The navigation algorithm can easily be executed in 
real time on a low-end personal computer. 
2.2. Preliminary analysis of coloring algorithm 
Both the stereo algorithm and the coloring (blob-based) algorithm are specialized 
mechanisms that make assumptions about the structure of their environments. They 
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perform properly when run in environments in which their assumptions hold, but may 
fail otherwise. Unfortunately, their assumptions are not explicitly represented. Neither 
algorithm would have any mention of the flatness of the floor in its source code listing, 
except, perhaps, as a comment. 
We can understand the coloring algorithm by deriving it from the stereo algorithm 
by means of a series of transformations. The stereo system measures free space directly 
by computing a depth map and projecting it into the floor plane. Since we are only 
concerned with determining which side has more free space, however, we do not need 
to know the exact distances in any particular unit of measure. Any measure will do 
provided that we use it consistently. In fact, we can substitute for the stereo system any 
system that computes a strictly increasing function of the free space. It has been known 
at least since Euclid that image plane height is such a distance measure for points on 
a ground plane. This means, roughly, that we can replace stereo computations with the 
image plane heights of obstacles, provided that obstacles rest on the floor and we have 
some way of labeling each pixel as being either obstacle or carpet. A general obstacle 
detector might be more difficult to build than the original stereo system. However, the 
carpet in this environment has a very predictable appearance-it has no texture-and so 
we can substitute a texture detector for the obstacle detector. 
We can summarize this analysis with the following general principles: 
l We can substitute any monotonic measure of a quantity for a calibrated measure, 
provided that the measure will only be used for comparisons. 
l We can substitute height in the image plane for some other distance calculation, 
provided that all objects rest on the floor and there is some way of classifying 
pixels as being floor or object. 
l We can substitute a texture detector for a floor detector, provided that the floor is 
textureless, and the obstacles do have texture. 
These principles concisely describe the specialization of the coloring algorithm. Each 
describes a general transformation from a possibly inefficient algorithm to a more ef- 
ficient one, along with the conditions on the task and environment that make it valid. 
The transformations can be used to predict the performance of the coloring algorithm in 
novel environments, or reused in the design of new systems. For example, if we wanted 
to use the blob-based algorithm in an environment with a textured carpet, we would 
have to abandon the last transformation, but we would still be able to use the other two. 
If there was some property other than texture which allowed carpet pixels to be easily 
classified, then we could use that property as the basis of a new transformation. 
3. Preview 
The main point of this paper is that we can usefully analyze specialized systems by 
deriving them from general systems using a chain of conditional optimizations. 
Implicit in these claims is the promise that such an analysis can be made formal 
and precise. However, the “analysis” in the previous section was handwavy, to say the 
least. Most of the rest of the paper is devoted to an extended example showing one 
way of making the analysis precise. This entails a great deal of formalism which is 
otherwise uninteresting. The reader may want to skim the most formal sections or skip 
them entirely. 
The paper should not be interpreted as arguing for any particular choice of notation. 
The notations used here, while quite serviceable, were chosen largely because they were 
given to a more compact exposition than the alternatives in the literature. Nonetheless. 
alternatives do exist (see Section 4). 
Section 4 surveys the literature on environmental analysis. The rest of the paper 
is devoted to a detailed analysis of the navigational systems of the Polly robot. The 
navigation system was not cooked up to suit the needs of the formalism. Polly is a real, 
working, vision-based robot in day-to-day use at the MIT AI lab. Section 5 fleshes out 
the notions of environment, transformation, and so on. Section 6 then fully formalizes 
these notions for the purpose of analyzing the blob coloring algorithm, the basis of 
Polly’s low level navigation system. Section 7 extends the formalism to encompass state 
changes and actions. Section 8 uses this extended formalism to analyze Polly’s high 
level navigation system. Section 9 then gives concluding remarks. 
4. Related work 
Relatively little attention has been devoted to environmental specialization in computer 
science. mostly likely because it is only recently that we have begun to construct 
computational systems that are closely coupled to natural environments. 
In biology, a great deal of attention has been given to the specialization of complete 
agents to their environments. Cybernetics, the progenitor of artificial intelligence, also 
focused on agent/environment interactions, although not necessarily on the properties 
of specific, complex environments [ 451. Ideas from these areas are now being applied 
to artificial intelligence and robotics (see [ 29,30,34] ) . 
In perceptual psychology, Gibson proposed an “ecological” theory of perception that 
stressed the role of the environment in forming an agent’s perceptions. Gibson argued 
that the structure of the environment determines a set of invariants in the energy flowing 
through the environment and that these invariants can be directly picked up by the 
perceptual apparatus of the organism via a process akin to resonance. 
Marr [28] argued that in order to properly understand the operation of a perceptual 
system (or more generally, of any intelligent system), we must understand the problem 
it solves at the level of a conzpututional theov. ’ The computational theory defines the 
desired input-output behavior of the perceptual system, along with a set of constraints 
on the possible interpretations of a given input. The constraints were necessary because 
a single stimulus can usually be generated by an infinite number of possible situations. 
The virtue of a computational theory is that it abstracts away from the details of an 
individual mechanism. A single computational theory can be used to explain and unify 
many different mechanisms that instantiate it. To Marr, the role of the constraints within 
computational theories was to show how the structure of the environment made interpre- 
tation possible at all, not how to make it more efficient. Marr believed that the human 
’ Marr’s actual story is more complicated than this. and used three levels of explanation, not two. See I28 I. 
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visual system was a general mechanism for constructing three-dimensional descriptions 
of the environment and so was relatively unconcerned with understanding how a system 
could be specialized to take advantage of useful, but unnecessary, properties of the envi- 
ronment. This work extends Marr’s ideas by using constraints to explain optimizations 
at the implementation level. 
Most formal models of environments use state-space descriptions of the environment, 
usually finite-state machines. Rosenschein and Kaelbling used finite state machines 
to represent both agent and environment (see [36-381). Their formalization allowed 
specialized mechanisms to be directly synthesized from descriptions of desired behavior 
and a formalization of the behavior of the environment. The formalization was powerful 
enough to form the basis of a programming language used to program a real robot. 
Later, Rosenschein developed a method for synthesizing automata whose internal states 
had provable correlations to the state of the environment given a set of temporal logic 
assertions about the dynamics of the environment. Donald and Jennings [ 121 use a 
geometric, but similar, approach for constructing virtual sensors. 
Wilson [46] has specifically proposed the classification of simulated environments 
based on the types of mechanisms which can operate successfully within them. Wilson 
also used a finite state formalization of the environment. He divided environments into 
three classes based on properties such as determinacy. Todd and Wilson [43] used 
finite state machines to taxonomize grid worlds for a class of artificial agents created 
by a genetic algorithm. Littman [25] used FSM models to classify environments for 
reinforcement learning algorithms. Littman parameterized the complexity of RL agents 
in terms of the amount of local storage they use and how far into the future the RL 
algorithm looks. He then empirically classified environments by the minimal parameters 
that still allowed an optimal control policy to be learned. 
There is also an extensive literature on discrete-event dynamic systems (see [23] for 
a readable introduction), which also model the environment as a finite state machine, 
but which assume that transition information (rather than state information) is visible 
to the agents. 
Several researchers have discussed how time-extended patterns of interaction with the 
environment (called “dynamics” by Agre [ l] ) can be used to reduce the computational 
burden on an agent. Lyons and Hendriks have discussed how to derive and exploit useful 
dynamics from a formal specification of the environment [ 271. They use a uniform 
formalization of both agent and environment based on process algebra. Using temporal 
logic, they are able to identify useful dynamics and design reactive behaviors to exploit 
them. Hammond, Converse, and Grass discuss how new dynamics can be designed into 
an agent to improve the stability of the agent/environment system [ 161. 
5. Analyzing specialized agents 
We will assume that we can reasonably separate the world into agent and environment. 
‘Ihe world here need not mean the entire physical universe, only that portion of it which 
is relevant to our analysis. Let A denote some set of possible agents and E a set of 
environments. Each agent/environment pair will form a dynamic system with some 
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behavior. We will also assume some task-specific notion of equivalence over possible 
behaviors. We will write (ai, el ) E (~2, e2) to mean that the behavior of ai operating 
in ei is equivalent to the behavior of a2 in e2. We can then say that two agents are 
equivalent if they are equivalent in all environments: 
al = a2 iff Vet,ez.(ai,ei) = (u2,e2). 
We will call them conditionally equivalent given some environmental constraint C if 
they are equivalent in all environments satisfying C. We will write this al Z_C az. Thus 
UI fc a2 iff Vei,e2.C(ei) AC(e2) * (at,ei) = (u2,e2). 
Often, the designer has a particular behavior that they want the agent to achieve. Then 
the only useful behavioral distinction is whether the agent “works” or not, and so the 
= relation will divide the possible behaviors into only two classes, working and not 
working. Let the habitat HA of agent A be set of environments in which it works. We 
will often refer to environment constraints as habitat constraints, since the habitat can 
be described as a constraint or conjunction of constraints. 
5. I. Specialization as optimization 
Suppose we want to understand an agent s that is somehow specialized to its envi- 
ronment. Although s might be more efficient than some more general system g, it may 
also have a smaller habitat, i.e. H, C_ H,. If we can find a sequence of mechanisms s; 
and domain constraints C;, such that 
then we have that g GC,~...~~,, s. We can phrase this latter statement in English as: 
within the environments that sati& Cl, . . , C,,, g and s are behaviorally equivalent- 
they will work in exactly the same cases. This lets us express the habitat of s in terms 
of the habitat of g: 
H,, 2 HgnCl I-I..-nC,,. 
Note that the left- and right-hand sides are not necessarily equal because there may be 
situations where S works but g does not. One of the constraints on the right-hand side 
might also be overly strong. 
I will call such a sequence of equivalences, in which g is gradually transformed into 
s, a derivation of s from g, in analogy to the derivations of equations. We will restrict 
our attention to the case where each derivation step si-1 -_c, s, can be seen as the 
result of applying some general optimizing transformation Oi that preserves equivalence 
given Ci (i.e. for which si = O;( s,_l) and for which a -_c, Oi(a) whenever Oi(a) is 
defined). Exhibiting such a derivation breaks s’s specialization into smaller pieces that 
are easier to understand. It also places the constraints Ci in correspondence with their 
optimizations Oi, making the computational value of each constraint explicit. Teasing 
these constraints apart helps predict the performance of the agent in novel environments. 
If an environment satisfies all the constraints, the agent will work. If it does not, then 
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we know which optimizations will fail, and consequently, which parts of the design to 
modify. In addition, if we can write a general emma to the effect that a -ci @(a), 
then we can reuse Oi in the design of future systems. Such lemmas may be of greater 
interest han the actual agents that inspired them. 
Note that we can equally well perform a derivation of one subsystem of an agent 
from another possible subsystem. For that reason, I will often use the term “mechanism” 
to mean either an agent or one of its subsystems. 
6. Analysis of simple perceptual systems 
In this section, we will perform a more detailed analysis of the coloring algorithm 
given in Section 2.1. To do this, we need to flesh out the notions of environment, 
behavior, and behavioral equivalence. Throughout he paper, we will use a state space 
formalization of the environment. In this section, we will only be concerned with the 
environment states themselves, not with the possible transitions between them. We will 
also ignore the internal state of the agent. In Section 7, we will add dynamics and 
internal state. 
Let W be the set of possible world states. We will model environments as subsets of 
W (we will consider other state spaces in Section 7.1). Thus & = 2w. Habitats, which 
we have defined as sets of environments, will then effectively just be (larger) regions 
of the state-space themselves. Habitat constraints, constraints over possible habitats, are 
then also effectively just subsets of W. 
Since we are ignoring dynamics and internal state, we will consider only those 
perceptual systems that give information about the instantaneous world state. Thus a 
perceptual system is a mechanism that has an identifiable output with an identifiable 
set of possible states S such that the state of the output is causally determined by 
the state of the world. Effectively, the perceptual system computes a function from 
W to S. We will call that function the information type that the perceptual system 
computes. We will say that two perceptual systems are behaviorally equivalent if they 
compute the same information type. An information type is finite if its range is finite. 
Note that information types should not be confused with the concept of information as 
inverse probability used in classical information theory (see [ 151). While the two are 
certainly compatible, classical information theory is concerned with measuring quantities 
of information, whereas our concern here is with distinguishing among different kinds 
of information. 
6.1. Derivability and equivalence 
Often what is interesting about an information type is what other information types 
can be computed from it. We will say that one information type I’ : W --+ S’ is derivable 
from another, I : W + S, if there exists a derivation function f for which I’ = f o I. II 
and 12 are equivalent (written ii = 12) if they are interderivable. 
The range of an information type is irrelevant o derivability; We can arbitrarily 
rename the elements of its range without changing what can be derived from it. Thus 
what really matters is the partition PI it induces on the world states: 
P, = {A c W 1 x,y t A w I(x) = I(y)}. 
The elements of the partition are the maximal sets of world states that are indistinguish- 
able given only I. One can easily show that* 
Lemma 1. The following stutements are equivalent: 
( I ) 11 and 12 are equivalent, that is, interderivable. 
(2) X is derivable from 11 iff it is derivable from 12, for all X. 
(3) The partitions PI, and PI: are identical. 
(4) 11 and 12 di$fer only by u bijection (a 1-I onto mapping). 
We will say that I and I’ are condition+ identical given C (written I =c I’) if 
I (bv) = I’(w) for all w t C. Note that I =lv I and that It =c, 12 and f2 =cz 1s implies 
ft =c,n~2 Is. Finally, we will say that two perceptual systems are behaviorally equivalent 
if they compute the same information type and conditionally equivalent given C if their 
information types are conditionally identical given C. 
6.2. Unconditional equivalence transformations 
We will use a single box labeled with an information type I 
to represent a perceptual system that (somehow) computes the 1. The double arrow 
is meant to represent a connection to the environment. When we want to expose the 
internal structure in the system, we will use single arrows to represent connections 
wholly within the system. Thus 
represents a system which first computes I and then applies the transformations f, g, 
. . to it. Finally, we will denote predicates with a “?‘, thus 
denotes a system which outputs true when I (KJ) > T, and false otherwise. These 
diagrams inherit the associativity of function composition: 
and so a simple optimization, which we might call “folding” (after constant-folding in 
compiler optimization), is the replacement of a series of computations with a single 
computation: 
2 SW ] I9 1 for El proof 
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One example of an optimizing transformation is what might be called “decalibration”. 
Estimating precise parameters such as depth can be difficult and can require precise 
sensor calibration. Often all that is done with this information is to compare it to some 
empirical threshold. For example, we might estimate the distance to an obstacle to decide 
whether we should swerve around it, or whether it is too late and we must brake to 
avoid collision. Generally, the designer arbitrarily chooses a threshold or determines it 
experimentally. In such situations, we can use any mechanism that computes distance in 
any units, provided that we correct the threshold. 
Lemma 2 (Decalibration) . For any information type I : W + Ii2 (IR is the set of real 
numbers) and any strictly increasing function f : I$ -+ JR, 
+j-yT+ c ++I>fo?li. 
Proof. By associativity, the right-hand side is equivalent to 
+&-ZK+ 
and for all x, f(x) > f(T) iff x > T, thus (> f(T)?) of = (> T?). •! 
Decalibration allows a calibrated mechanism to be replaced with an uncalibrated 
mechanism, in certain cases. 
6.3. Transformations over simple vision systems 
The coloring algorithm used image plane height to discriminate depth and a texture 
detector to find obstacles. In this section, we will derive sufficient conditions for the 
validity of these techniques. We will show that image plane height is a strictly increasing 
function of object depth, provided the object rests on the floor and its projection into 
the floor is contained within its region of contact with the floor. We will also show that 
for floors whose surface markings have no spatial frequencies below w and which are 
viewed from a distance of at least d, any low pass filter with a passband in the region 
(0, dw) can be used to discriminate between objects and floor. The proof is not terribly 
interesting in itself. The reader may wish to skip to Section 6.4. 
First, we need to define our coordinate systems, one camera-centered, in which the 
forward direction (z) is the axis of projection, and the other body-centered, in which 
the forward (2) direction is the direction of motion (see Fig. 4). We will assume that 
the camera faces forward, but somewhat down, and so the camera- and body-centered 
frames share their left/right axis, which we will call X. We will call the up/down axes 
for the camera- and body-centered systems y and Y, respectively. We will assume that 
the ground plane lies at Y = 0. We will denote the image with range set X by Z(X) so 
the b/w images are Z(R) and the color images are Z(W3). 
The projection process can be specified in either of these coordinate frames. In 
camera-centered coordinates, the projection process maps a point (X, y, z ) in the world 
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I optic axis 
center of body 
coordinate system 
p, 
Ground plane 
Fig. 4. A camera viewing a ground plane. The X axis (not shown) comes out of the page and is shared by 
the camera and body coordinate frames. The body coordinate frame is formed by X, Y and 2, the camera 
frame, by X, y and z. z is also the axis of projection, or optic axis, of the camera. h is the height of the 
camera and P is an arbitrary point on the ground plane. 
to a point (fX/z, J‘y/z) on the image plane, where f is the focal length of the lens. In 
the body-centered coordinate system, projection is best expressed with vector algebra. 
A point P in the world will be projected to the image plane point 
,f(P- h) 
‘= z.(P-h)’ 
(These are 3D coordinates; the 2D coordinates are obtained by projecting it onto the 
image plane axes X and y, yielding the coordinates (X . p, y. p> ) 
6.3.1. Salience functions and jigure/ground separation 
Let 0 be a set of objects and FGo : W + I( {T, F}) (“figure/ground”) be the unique 
information type that, for all world states, returns an image in which pixels are marked 
“T” if they were imaged in that world state from one of the objects 0, otherwise “F”. 
A perceptual system that can compute FGo within its habitat can distinguish 0 from 
the background. FGo can be arbitrarily difficult (consider the case where 0 is the set 
of chameleons or snipers). Fortunately, there are often specific cues that allow objects 
to be recognized in specific contexts. We will call these cues salience functions. An 
information type is a salience function if it is conditionally equivalent to FGo given some 
constraint (a “salience constraint”). The use of such simple, easily computed functions 
to find particular classes of objects is common both in AI (see [ 11,20,42,44,47] ) and 
in the biological world (see [ 351 for a good introduction). 
The coloring algorithm uses the texture detector as a salience function. We want to 
determine what salience constraint is required for a given texture detector. For simplicity, 
we will restrict ourselves to Fourier-based measures of texture. Effectively, a texture 
detector examines a small patch of the image. We can approximate the projection of a 
small patch with 
(X,y,z) H (fxlzo~.fYlzo) 
where ~0 is the distance to the center of the surface patch. A sufficiently small patch 
can be treated as a plane with a some local coordinate system (x’, y’). Suppose the 
patch’s reflectance varies as a sinusoid with frequency vector 3. Then its reflectance R 
at a point (x’, y’) on the patch is given by: 
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Zero band 
Projected zero band 
Fig. 5. The effect of perspective projection on local frequency distributions. 
R(X’,y’) = t sin& +sitl$ +i. 
( > 
If we view the patch: 
l from a unit distance, 
l through a lens of unit focal length, 
l from a direction normal to the patch, 
l with the X axis aligned with the x’ axis, and 
l with even illumination of unit intensity 
then the image intensity will simply be 
I(%Y) = N&Y). 
Now consider the effect of changing the viewing conditions. Doubling the distance or 
halving the focal length halves the size of the image. 
Z(x,y) =R($,g) = k 
( 
sin&+sin& 
Y 1 
+ i. 
The image is still a sine wave grating, but its projected frequency is doubled. Rotating 
the patch by and angle 6 around the X axis shrinks the image along the Y axis by a 
factor of cos 13, producing a sine wave of frequency (w,, w,/cos 0) : 
I(x,y)=R(X,yCOS8)=~ sinX+sin- 
( 
ycose 
wx WY > 
+;. 
Rotating about the Y shrinks the X axis. Rotating about the optic axis simply rotates the 
frequency vector. 
Thus a sine wave grating viewed from any position appears as a grating with identical 
amplitude but with a frequency vector modified by a scaling of its components and 
possibly a rotation. Since the projection process is linear, we can extend this to arbitrary 
power spectra: the power spectrum of the patch’s projection will be the power spectrum 
of the patch, rotated and stretched along each axis (see Fig. 5). Frequency bands of the 
patch are transformed into elliptical regions of the frequency domain of its projection. 
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Fig. 6. Monotonicity of image plane height in body depth. Rays projected from the point of projection to 
points on the ground plane pass through successively higher points on the image plane as they move to more 
distant points on the ground plane. 
Bounds on the possible viewing conditions yield bounds on how much the frequency 
bands can be deformed. 
The background texture constmint (BTC) requires that all surface patches of the 
background have surface markings whose power spectra are bounded below by w, that 
all objects have surface markings with energy below w, and that no surface in view is 
closer than d focal lengths, and that the scene is uniformly lit. We have that 
Lemma 3. Any thresholded lineurfiltering of the image with u passband in the interval 
(0, dw) is a salience function given the background texture constraint. 
Proof. By assumption, no patch of the background has energy in the band (0, w), but 
all objects do. By the reasoning above, when any patch, either object or background, is 
viewed fronto-parallel from distance d, the band (0, w) projects to the band (0, dw). 
Thus a patch was imaged from an object iff its projection has energy in this band. But 
note that increasing the distance or changing the viewing orientation can only increase 
the size of the projected frequency ellipse. Thus for any distance greater than d and 
any viewing orientation, a patch will have energy in (0, dw) iff it was imaged from an 
object. Thus a thresholded linear filter is a salience function given BTC. 0 
The corollary to this is that any thresholded linear filter with passband in (0,dw) 
is conditionally equivalent to a figure/ground system given the background texture 
constraint. 
6.3.2. Depth recover) 
Depth can be measured in either a camera-centered or a body-centered coordinate 
system. We will call these “camera depth” and “body depth”, respectively. The camera 
depth of a point P is its distance to the image plane, z . (P - h). Body depth, on the 
other hand, is how far forward the robot can drive before it collides with the point, Z. P. 
We will concern ourselves with body depth. 
Consider a world of flat objects lying on a ground plane. Then both object points and 
ground plane points have zero Y coordinates. The points must be linear combinations 
of X and 2. Since both z and Z are perpendicular to X, the X component of the point 
will make no contribution either to camera depth or to body depth and we can restrict 
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our attention to the one-dimensional case, shown in Fig. 4, of a point P = nZ. Its body 
depth is simply II, while its camera depth z . (nZ - h) depends on camera placement. 
We can see by inspection, however, that the camera depth is linear in n and so camera 
depth and body depth are related by a linear mapping. More surprisingly, image plane 
height is a strictly increasing function of body depth. This can be seen from Fig. 6. It 
can also be shown analytically. The image plane height of P is 
Y* 
f(nZ - h) 
> 
=y.(fnZ-fh) nff-S =- 
z . (nZ - h) nz.Z-z.h M-r 
for cr = fZ. y, /3 = z . Z, y = z . h, and S = f h . y. Differentiating with respect to n, we 
obtain 
a(@ - r) - p(na - S) PS-o,Y 
(np - r)* = (np- y)2’ 
When the camera looks forward and P is in front of the agent, we have that n, /I, S > 0, 
and ya < 0, so the derivative is strictly positive. 
The ground plane constraint (GPC) requires that the camera view a set of the objects 
0 resting on a ground plane G, and that for each o E 0, o is completely in view and 
o’s projection in G is its set of points of contact with G.3 Thus pyramids resting on 
their bases would satisfy the restriction, but not pyramids resting on their points. Given 
GPC, we can use least y coordinate as a measure of the depth of the closest object. 
Let Body-Depth, be the information type which gives the correct body depth for pixels 
generated by one of the objects 0, or cc for pixels generated by the background. 
Lemma 4. Let R be a region of the image. Then minR oBody-Depth, is conditionally 
equivalent to min{y : FGo(x, y) for some (x,y) E R} given GPC, module a strictly 
increasing function. 
Proof. Note that there can only be one minimal depth, but there can be many minimal- 
depth object points. However, it must be the case that some contact point (an object 
point touching the floor) has minimal depth, otherwise there would be an object point 
whose ground plane projection was not a contact point, a contradiction. Let p be a 
minimal-depth contact point. We want to show that no object point can have a smaller 
projected y coordinate than p. Since the y coordinate is invariant with respect to changes 
in the X coordinate, a point which projects to a lesser y coordinate than p must have 
either a smaller Z coordinate or a smaller Y coordinate. The first would contradict p’s 
being a minimal-depth point while the latter would place the point below the ground 
plane. Thus p must have a minimal y projection. We have already shown that for contact 
points the y projection is strictly increasing in body depth. 0 
A trivial corollary to this lemma is that the height of the lowest figure pixel in an 
image column gives the distance to the nearest object in the direction corresponding to 
the column. 
3 Formalizing the notion of “touches” can be difficult (see for example [13, Chapter 81). but we will treat 
the notion as primitive, since the particular formalization is unimportant for our purposes. 
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6.4. Derivation of the coloring algorithm 
We can now derive the coloring algorithm from the stereo algorithm. Recall the stereo 
system: 
&&&~~i. 
By Lemma 4, the stereo system is conditionally equivalent given GPC (modulo a 
monotonic function) to any system of the form 
where “FG” is some computation that performs figure/ground separation. By Lemma 3, 
this is conditionally equivalent given BTC to 
where “filter” is any linear filter restricted to the frequency band (0, dw), such as an 
edge detector operating at a scale larger than the floor texture: 
Since the coloring system and the stereo system yield outputs which differ by monotonic 
functions, it remains to be shown that substituting one for the other leads to the same 
motor behavior. It can be shown that for a steering system based on balancing left and 
right distances the attractor and repeller basins in the robot’s configuration space are 
invariant with respect to this substitution, provided that we can mode1 the steering motor 
as a first order system. Doing so, however, requires the introduction of still more math, 
so the interested reader is directed to [ 191. 
Even this is a restricted derivation, since it assumes fully textured objects. The deriva- 
tion can be extended to untextured objects with different reflectances than the back- 
ground. While space precludes a full derivation, the argument goes as follows. Untex- 
tured objects still trigger the texture detector at their boundaries. We can then compute 
the correct figure/ground map by filling the interiors of closed contours in the texture 
image. However, the column heights are invariant with respect to the interior tilling 
operation, provided that the full object is in view (if part of it runs off the bottom of 
the screen, the coloring of the filled and unfilled versions will differ). Thus the raw 
coloring algorithm will still work on untextured objects, provided they have different 
reflectances than the background and they are in full view. 
The derivation shows that the background texture constraint is used to simplify fig- 
ure/ground separation. More importantly, it shows that it is not used for anything else. 
If we wish to run the system in an environment that does not satisfy the background 
texture constraint, but which does satisfy the ground plane constraint, then we can sub- 
stitute any salience constraint that holds in the new environment. For example, if the 
background has a distinctive color or set of colors, then we might use a color system 
such as that of Turk et al. [ 441, or Crisman [ 111, to find the floor: 
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+j-z&~]+. 
If we wanted to build a system that worked in both environments, then we could 
implement both systems and switch between them opportunistically, provided there was 
sufficient information to determine which one to use. We could even implement the 
original stereo system in parallel with these systems and add another switch. 
7. Analysis of action selection 
In this section we will apply transformational techniques to action-selection tasks 
with the goal of demonstrating a number of formal conditions under which we can 
reduce deliberative planning systems to reactive systems. We will continue to model 
the environment as a dynamic system with a known set of possible states. First, we 
will add actions (state transitions) to the environment, making it a full state-machine. 
We will then model both deliberative planning systems and reactive systems as variants 
of the control policies of classical control theory (see [ 261 or [ 71) . This gives us a 
uniform vocabulary for expressing both types of systems. We can then examine various 
formal conditions on the environment that allow simplifications of the control policy 
(e.g. substitution of a reactive policy for a deliberative one) 
Again, the focus of this paper is the use of transformational analysis, not the specifics 
of the notation used below. The notation is needed to establish a framework within 
which to apply the transformations. The notation used here is largely equivalent to those 
used by Rosenschein and Kaelbling [38], and by Donald and Jennings [ 121. It was 
chosen for largely for compactness of presentation. The formal trick of externalizing the 
agent’s internal state also turns out to be useful. 
7.1. Environments 
We will now allow different environments to have different state spaces and will treat 
actions as mappings from states to states. An environment will then be a state machine 
E = (S, A) formed of a state space S and a set of actions A which are mappings from 
s to s. 
For example, consider a robot moving along a corridor with n equally spaced offices 
labeled 1, 2, and so on. We can formalize this as the environment Z, = ((0, 1, . . . , n - 
1 }, { inc,, dec, i}) , where i is the identity function, and where inc, and dec map an integer 
i to i + 1 and i - 1, respectively, with the proviso that dec( 0) = 0 and inc, (n - 1) = n - 1 
(see Fig. 7). Note that the effect of performing the identity action is to stay in the same 
state. 
7.1.1. Discrete control problems 
We will say that a discrete control problem, or DCP, is a pair D = (E, G) where 
E is an environment and G, the goal, is a region of E’s state space. The problem of 
getting to the beginning of the corridor for our robot would be the DCP (Z”, (0)). By 
abuse of notation, we will also write a DCP as a triple (S, A, G). A finite sequence of 
(dec,ij (inc,i) 
(i,inc) (inc,i) (i.inc) 
(dec,i) 
(i,dec) 
(incj) (inc,i) 
(i,dec) 
Fig. 7. The environment Zs (Top) and the serial product of & with itself (Bottom), expressed as graphs. 
Function products have been written as pairs, i.e. inc x i is written as (inc. i). Identity actions (i and i x i) 
have been omitted to reduce clutter. 
actionsa=(at,a2....,a,,) solvesDfromirzitialstutesifa,(a,-l(.,.a,(s))) EC. D 
is solvable from s if such a sequence exists. D is solvable (in general) if it is solvable 
from all s E S. 
7.1.2. Cartesian products 
Often, the state space of the environment is structured into distinct components that 
can be acted upon independently. The position of the king on a chess board has row and 
column components, for example. Thus we would like to think of the king-on-a-chess- 
board environment as being the “product” of the environment Zs with itself (since there 
are eight rows and eight columns), just as IR2 is the Cartesian product of the reals with 
themselves. However, consider an environment in which a car drives through an 8 x 8 
grid of city blocks. We would also like to think of this environment as being the product 
of Zs with itself. Both the car and the king have 8 x 8 grids as their state spaces, but 
the car can only change one of its state components at a time, whereas the king can 
change both by moving diagonally. 
We will therefore distinguish two different Cartesian products of environments, the 
parallel product, which corresponds to the king case, and the serial product, which 
corresponds to the car case. Let the Cartesian product of two functions f and g be 
,f x x: (a, 0) H ( f(u), g( b) ), and let i be the identity function. For two environments 
Et = (St, Al ) and E2 = (Sz, AZ), we will define the parallel product to be 
El 11 E2 = (St x S2, {u, x u2 : ul E A,, u2 E A2}) 
and the serial product to be 
1. Horswill/Art@cial Intelligence 73 (1995) l-30 19 
El + E2 = (S, x S2, {a, x i : aI E A,} U {i x a2 : a2 E AZ}). 
The products of DCPs are defined in the obvious way: 
(EI,G) II (E29G2) = (El (1 E2,G x G2). 
(EI,GI) = (E2,G2) = (EI = E2,G1 x G2). 
The state diagram for & G+ Z2 is shown in Fig. 7. 
We will say that a an environment or DCP is parallel (or serial) separable if it is 
isomorphic to a product of environments or DCPs. 
7.1.3. Solvability of separable DCPs 
The important property of separable DCPs is that their solutions can be constructed 
from solutions to their components: 
Claim 5. Let D1 and 02 be DCPs. Then DI ti D2 is solvable from state (~1, ~2) iff 
D1 is solvable from SI and D2 is solvable from ~2, 
Proof. Consider a sequence S that solves the product from (st , ~2). Let Sr and S2 be 
the sequences of actions from DI and D2, respectively, that together form S, so that if 
S were the sequence 
(uxi,ixx,ixy,bxi,ixz,cxi) 
then St would be (a, b, c) and S2 would be (x, y, z). S must leave the product in 
some goal state (gr, g2). By definition, gr and g2 must be goal states of DI and D2 
and so Sr and S2 must be solution sequences to D1 and D2, respectively. Conversely, 
we can construct a solution sequence to the product from solution sequences for the 
components. 0 
The parallel product case is more complicated because the agent must always change 
both state components. This leaves the agent no way of preserving one solved sub- 
problem while solving another. Consider a “flip-flop” environment F = ((0, 1}, Gflip}) 
where&(x) = 1 - x. F has the property that every state is accessible from every other 
state. F + F also has this property. F 11 F does not however. F 11 F has only one action, 
which flips both state components at once. Thus only two states are accessible from any 
given state in F (( F, the state and its flip. As with the king, the problem is fixed if we 
add the identity action to F. Then it is possible to leave one component of the product 
intact, while changing the other. The identity action, while sufficient, is not necessary. 
A weaker, but still unnecessary, condition is that F have some action that always maps 
goal states to goal states. 
Claim 6. Let D1 and D2 be DCPs. rf D1 // D 2 is solvable from state (~1, ~2) then DI 
is solvable from s1 and D2 is solvable from ~2. The converse is also true if for every 
goal state of D1 and D2, there is an action that maps to another goal state. 
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Proof. Again, let S be a solution sequence from (si , ~2). Now let Si and & be the 
sequences of obtained by taking the first and second components, respectively, of each 
element of S. Thus, if S is 
(axx,bxy,cxz) 
then we again have that Si is (a, 19, c) and S2 is (x, y, z ). Again, Si and S2 are solution 
sequences for their respective component problems. Similarly, we can form a solution 
to the product from solutions to the components by combining them element-wise. To 
do this, the solutions to the components must be of the same length. Without loss of 
generality, let Si be the shorter solution. Since there is always an action to map a goal 
state to a goal state, we can pad Si with actions that will keep Dt within its goal region. 
The combination of S2 and the padded Si must then be a solution to the product. 0 
7.2. Agents 
We will assume an agent uses some policy to choose actions. A policy p is a mapping 
from states to actions. We will say that p: 
l generates a state sequence s; when s;+i = (p( si)) (si) for all i. 
l generates an action sequence ai when it generates si and ai = p( si) for all i. 
l solves I3 from state s when p generates a solution sequence from s. 
l solves D when it solves D from all states. 
l solves D and halts when it solves D and for all s E G, (p(s) ) (s) E G. 
For example, the constant function p(s) = dec is a policy that solves the DCP (Z,, (0))) 
and halts. 
7.2.1. Hidden state and sensors 
A policy uses perfect information about the world to choose an action. In real life, 
agents only have access to sensory information. Let T: S + X be the information type 
(see Section 6) provided by the agent’s sensors. The crucial question about T is what 
information can be derived from it. We will say that an information type is observable 
if it is derivable from T. 
To choose actions, we need a mapping not from world states S to A, but from sensor 
states X to A. We will call such a mapping a T-policy. A function p is a T-policy for 
a DCP D if p o T is a policy for D. We will say that p T-solves D from a given state 
if p o T solves it, and that p T-solves D (in general) if it T-solves it from any initial 
state. 
7.2.2. Externalization of internal state 
We have also assumed that the agent itself has no internal state-that its actions are 
determined completely by the state of its sensors. In real life, agents generally have 
internal state. We will model internal state as a form of external (environmental) state 
with perfect sensors and effecters. Let the register environment RA over an alphabet A 
be the environment whose state space is A and whose actions are the constant functions 
over A. We will write the constant function whose value is always a as C,. The action 
C,, “writes” a into the register. We will call E 11 RA the augmentation of E with the 
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alphabet A. An agent operating in the augmentation can, at each point in time, read the 
states of E and the register, perform an action in E, and write a new value into the 
register. 
Using external state for internal state is not simply mathematical artifice. Agents can 
and do use the world as external memory. An agent need only isolate some portion of 
the world’s state (such as the appearance of a sheet of paper) which can be accurately 
sensed and controlled. Humans do this routinely. Appointment books allow people to 
keep their plans for the day in the world, rather than in their scarce memory. Bartenders 
use the position of a glass on the bar to encode what type of drink they intend to mix 
and how far they are into the mixing (see [ 61). For an example of a program that uses 
external state, see [2]. 
7.3. Progress functions 
A progress function is a measure of distance to a goal. In particular, a progress 
function Q, for a DCP D = (S, A, G) is a non-negative function from S to the reals for 
which 
( 1) @ is nonnegative, i.e. Q(s) 2 0 for all s. 
(2) @(s) = 0 iff s E G. 
(3) For any initial state i from which D is solvable, there exists a solution sequence 
S= (a,,. . . , a,) along which @ is strictly decreasing (i.e. @( Uj(. . . (al (i) ) ) ) > 
@(aj+l (aj(’ **al(i)))) for all j). 
The term “progress function” is taken from the program verification literature, where 
it refers to functions over the internal state of the program that are used to prove 
termination of loops. Progress functions are also similar to Liapunov functions (see 
[26] ), admissible heuristics (see [ 5, Volume 1, Chapter II]), and artificial potential 
fields (see [21] or [24]). 
We will say that a policy p honors a non-negative function @, if @ steadily decreases 
it until it reaches zero, i.e. for all states s and some E > 0, either @((p(s))(s)) < 
a(s) - E or else Q(s) = @( (p(s) ) (s) ) = 0. A policy that honors @ can be thought 
of as doing hill-climbing on @ and so will run until it reaches a local minimum of @. 
When @ also happens to be a progress function for the DCP, that local minimum will 
be a global minimum corresponding to the goal: 
Lemma 7. Let @: S + R be non-negative and let p be a policy for a DCP D that 
honors @. Then p solves D and halts exactly when @ is a progress function on D. 
Proof. Consider the execution of p from an arbitrary initial state i. On each step, the 
value of Q, decreases by at least E until it reaches 0, after which it must remain zero. 
Thus @ must converge to zero within a(i)/& steps after which the state of the system 
is confined to the set @-’ (0). We need only show that @-’ (0) C_ G iff @ is a progress 
function for D. If @ is a progress function @-’ (0) c G holds by definition. To see the 
converse, suppose @-’ (0) 2 G. We want to show that from every state from which D 
is solvable, there is a solution sequence that monotonically decreases @. The sequence 
generated by p is a such a sequence. 0 
Progress functions can be generated directly from policies. The standard progress 
function @,,,J on a policy p that solves D is the number of steps in which p solves 
D from a given state. An important property of product DCPs is that we can construct 
progress functions for products from progress functions for their components: 
Lemma 8. If @I is a progress function for DI and cP2 is a progress function for D2, 
then @: ( .Y, y) H @I (x) + @2(y) is a progress function for the serial product of the 
DCPs. 
Proof. Since @I > 0 and @2 > 0, we have that Q, > 0. Similarly, @ must be zero for 
exactly the goal states of the product. Now suppose the product is solvable from ( SI , ~2). 
Then there must exist solution sequences for the components that monotonically decrease 
@I and @2, respectively. Any combination of these sequences to form a solution to the 
product must then monotonically decrease Cp, and so @ must be a progress function for 
the product. •J 
Again, the parallel case is more complicated: 
Lemma 9. lf @I is a progress function for DI and @2 is a progress function for D2, 
and for every goal state of DI and D2 there is an action that maps that state to a goal 
state, then Cp: (x, y) H 01 (x) + @2(,) is a progress function for the parallel product 
of the two DCPs. 
Proof. Again, we have that @ 3 0 and that @ is zero for exactly the goal states of the 
product. Now consider a state ( SI, ~2) from which the product is solvable. There must 
be solution sequences SI and S2 to the component problems along which cP1 and @2, 
respectively, are strictly decreasing. Without loss of generality, assume that SI is the 
shorter. Of the two solutions. We can pad SI and combine the solutions to produce a 
solution to the product. The padding cannot change the value of @I, and so the value 
of @ must be strictly decreasing along the combined solution. 0 
7.4. Construction of DCP solutions by decomposition 
7.4. I. Product DCPs 
We now have the tools to construct solutions to product DCPs from the solutions to 
their components: 
Lemma 10. Let pl be a policy which solves DI and halts from all states in some set 
of initial states 11, and let p2 be a policy which solves D2 and halts from all states in 
12. Then the poliq 
P(X,Y> =PI(x) x P2C.v) 
.solves Dl 11 02 and halts from all states in 11 x 12. (Note that here we are using the 
convention qf treating p, a ,function over pairs, as a function over two scalars.) 
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Lemma 11. Let p1 be a policy which solves D1 from all states in some set of initial 
states II, and let p2 be a policy which solves 02 from all states in 12. Then any policy 
for which 
p(x,y) = PI (x) x i or i x p2(y> 
and 
y E G2,X $Gl *PP(&y) =p1(x) x i, 
~EGI,Y#GGZ~P~X,Y)=~XP~~Y) 
will solve Dt + D2 and halt from all states in II x I2. 
Proof. We can prove both lemmas using progress functions. Let @‘,,,n, and @ppz,Dz be 
the standard progress for p] and p2 on DI and D2, respectively. Their sum must be a 
progress function for the product. This follows directly for the serial case, and from the 
fact that PI and p2 halt for the parallel case. Since the policies for both products clearly 
honor the sum, they must solve their respective products. Note that the constraint given 
in the second lemma is sufficient, but not necessary. 0 
7.4.2. Reduction 
We can often treat one environment as an abstraction of another; The abstract en- 
vironment retains some of the fundamental structure of the concrete environment but 
removes unimportant distinctions between states. An abstract state corresponds to a set 
of concrete states and abstract actions correspond to complicated sequences of concrete 
actions. 
Let a projection of an environment E = (S, A) into an abstract environment E’ = 
(S’, A’) be a mapping ST: S + S’ U (1). T gives the abstract state for a given con- 
crete state or else I if it has no corresponding abstract state. n--I gives the concrete 
states corresponding to a given abstract state. For sets of states, we will let rr-’ (S) = 
U SES 7r’(s). 
We define a r-implementation of an abstract action a’ to be a policy that reliably 
moves from states corresponding to an abstract state s’ to states corresponding the 
abstract state a’( s’) without visiting states corresponding to other abstract states. Thus 
for any s’ for which a’( s’) is defined, the implementation solves the DCP 
(F’({s’,I,a’(s’)}),A,7rTT-‘(a’(s’))). 
Note that we do not require p to stay in mTT-’ (a’( s’) ) upon reaching it. 
Given 9r-implementattons pa’ 0 f each abstract action a’, we can use an abstract policy 
p’ to solve problems in the concrete environment by emulating the abstract actions. We 
need only look up the abstract state corresponding to our current concrete state, look up 
the abstract action for the abstract state, and run its implementation. This suggests the 
policy 
P(S) = Pp’fTr(s))(S). 
This concrete policy works by taking the state s, looking up its abstract state rTT( s), 
computing the proper abstract action p’( r( s)), and then computing and running the 
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next concrete action in its implementation P~!(~(~)). Note that since this policy has 
no internal state, it effectively recomputes the abstract action each time it chooses a 
concrete action. This is no problem when the concrete environment is in a state that 
corresponds to an abstract state, but the r-implementations are allowed to visit states 
that have no abstract state. To handle this problem, it is necessary to add a state register 
to the environment to remember what abstract action is presently being performed. The 
policy for the augmented environment computes a new abstract action whenever the 
environment is in a concrete state with a corresponding abstract state. It stores the 
name of the new abstract action in the register for later use, while also executing it its 
implementation. When the environment is in a concrete state with no abstract state, it 
uses the abstract action stored in the register and preserves the value in the register: 
Lemma 12. Let D = (S, A, G), D’ = (S’, A’, G’) be DCPs, T be a projection of D 
into D’, and for each action a’ E A’, let pni be a r-implementation of a’ in D. If p’ is 
a policy which solves D’, then the policy 
p(s,a) = 
i 
P,(S) x &I, if r(s) = I, 
P~~(~(.~))(J) x C1j~~T(.y))~ otherwise, 
solves the augmentation of D with the alphabet A’, from any state in T-’ (S’). 
Proof. Let Qp,,nt be the standard progress function for p’ on D’ and let s E P-’ (S’). 
Then Qp,/,oj (rr( s) ) is the number of abstract actions need to solve the problem from 
the concrete state s. If @,l,Dt (r( s) ) = 0, then the problem is already solved, so suppose 
that p solves the problem from states s for which @,!,D! (rr( s)) = n and consider an 
s for which @,,,o, (r(s) ) = n + 1. The policy p will immediately compute p' ( QT( s) ) , 
store it into the register. Call this action a’. The policy p will also immediately begin 
executing pO/. Since this policy is a p-implementation of a’, the system must reach a 
state in r-’ (a’(n( s))) in finite time, which is to say that it will reach the next state in 
D’. By assumption, p’ can solve D’ from this high level state in n steps, and so p must 
be able to solve D from s, and so, by induction p solves D for all s E P-’ (S’). 0 
We will say that D is reducible to D’ if there exists a projection IT of D into D’ and 
r-implementations of all of actions in D’. If D is reducible to D’ then we can easily 
convert any solution to D’ into a solution to D. 
8. Analysis of a robot navigation system 
Consider the problem of piloting a robot about the office environment shown in Fig. 8. 
At any given moment, the robot must decide given its destination how fast to turn and 
how fast to move forward or backward. Polly uses the policy of following corridors 
except when it reaches intersections. At intersections it compares the coordinates of the 
intersection to the coordinates of its goal (presumed to be another intersection) and 
turns north when the goal is to the north, south when the goal is to the south, and so 
on: 
north 
east 
south 
west 
Fig. 8. Approximate layout of the seventh floor of the AI lab at MIT (Top) and its topological stmcture 
(Bottom). 
/ stop, if at goal, 
turn-north, if south of goal and at turn to north, 
turn-south, if north of goal and at turn to south, 
pPOIIy (sensors) = ( ’ ’ ’ 
turn-north, if south of goal and pointed south, 
turn-south, if north of goal and pointed north, 
. . . 
follow-corridor, otherwise. 
The details of the perception and control systems are given in [ 191. 
8.1. Derivation from a geometric path planner 
Geometric path planning is a common technique for solving this type of problem. 
Given a detailed description of the environment, a start position, and a goal position, 
a path planner computes a safe path through the environment from start to goal (see 
[ 241). Once the path has been planned, a separate system follows the path. Geometric 
planning is versatile and can produce very efficient paths, but is not computationally 
efficient. It also requires detailed knowledge of the environment which the perceptual 
system may be unable to deliver. 
We can clarify the relationship between a path planning system and Polly’s reactive 
algorithm by deriving Polly’s algorithm from the planing system. Let N be the DCP 
whose states are (position, orientation) pairs and whose actions are small (translation, 
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rotation) pairs such as the robot might move in one clock tick. Clearly, Polly can be 
modeled as an N policy. However, the planner can equally well be modeled as an N 
policy. A planner/executive is simply a policy that uses internal state to compute and 
execute a plan. The planning portion uses scratch memory to gradually compute a plan 
and store it in a plan register, while the executive reads the finished plan out of the 
register and executes each segment in turn. Thus a planner/executive architecture has 
the form: 
pa(s,plan,scr&&) = ’ ’ planN(s’scrurch)’ 
1’ 
if plan incomplete, 
execute(plan) x i, otherwise; 
execute(pfan) = head(plun) x Crair(p/un). 
An agent in N will spend nearly all its time in corridors. The only real choice points 
in this environment are the corridor intersections. Thus only the graph of corridors and 
intersections N’, need be searched, rather than the full state space of N (see Fig. 8). 
By Lemma 12, we can augment the environment with a register to hold the current 
north/south/east/west action and replace po with the policy 
I’] (s, action) = 
p,,;c~~~,,(s) x C,,;(,(,)). if at intersection, 
P~~(./~O11( .s ) x Cut~liOn 3 otherwise, 
where: 
l f(s) is the intersection at state S, 
l the different puctfon p olicies implement following north, south, east, and west cor- 
ridors, respectively, and, 
l pi is an arbitrary N’ policy. 
The lemma requires that the goal always be a corridor intersection and that the robot 
always be started from a corridor intersection. We could now solve N’ by adding plan 
and scratch registers and using a plan/execute policy: 
pi (intersec,plun, scratch) = 
i 
i x plan,, (intersec, scratch), if plan incomplete, 
execute(plutr) x i, otherwise. 
We can simplify further by noting that N’ is isomorphic to Zb + Zz, that is, the 
corridor network is a 4 x 2 grid. By Lemma 11, we can replace p{ with any policy that 
interleaves actions to reduce grid coordinate differences between the current location 
and the goal. We can then remove the plan and scratch registers from pr and reduce it 
to 
pz (s, action) = 
i 
pp;(j(,,,(.r) x C,;(j(,,,,, if at intersection, 
Puctio~t ( .r ) x CUtiOn? otherwise, 
where pi is any N’ policy satisfying the constraints that (1) it only stops at the goal, 
and (2) it only moves north/south/east/west if the goal is north/south/east/west of 
I(S). 
There are still two important differences between p2 and p,,,,~t+ Polly uses a different 
set of actions (“turn north” instead of “go north”) and it has no internal state to keep 
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Table I 
Summary of constraints and optimizations used in Polly’s navigation system. 
Constraint 
ground plane constraint 
background-texture constraint 
corridor network 
grid structure 
orientation correlation 
Optimization 
use height for depth estimation 
use texture for obstacle detection 
replace planning in N with planning in N’ 
replace planning with difference reduction 
store state in orientation 
track of its abstract action. While it appears to use a qualitatively different policy than 
we have derived, it does not. Within a short period of beginning a north action, an agent 
will always be pointed north. Similarly for east, south, and west actions. The orientation 
of the robot effectively is the action register and turn commands effectively write the 
register. There’s no need for internal memory. Polly stores its state in its motor. 
We can summarize the transformations used in the derivation as follows (see Table 1) . 
The constraint that the environment consist of a network of corridors and that the goal 
be a corridor intersection allows us to replace geometric planning with planning in the 
corridor graph. The isomorphism of the corridor graph to a grid allows us to replace 
planning with difference reduction. Finally, the correlation of the robot’s orientation with 
its internal state allows us to store the current action in the orientation. 
It is important to note that either, both, or neither of the subproblems (the abstracted 
environment and corridor following) could be solved using deliberative planning; the 
two decisions are orthogonal. If both are implemented using planners, then the resulting 
system is effectively a hierarchical planner (see [ 391 or [ 221). Polly’s environment 
happens to allow the use of simple reactive policies for both, so it is a layered re- 
active system [9]. In an environment with a more complicated graph topology, one 
could reverse the second optimization and use a deliberative planner, leaving the first 
optimization intact. The result would then be a hybrid system with planning on top 
and reacting on the bottom (see [ 8,14,27,40] for other examples). On the other hand, 
one could imagine an environment where the individual corridors were cluttered but 
were connected in a grid. In such an environment, the abstract problem could be solved 
reactively, but corridor following might actually require deliberative planning. 
9. Conclusions 
Fundamentally, this paper is about explanation. For one reason or another, we are 
often faced with agents or other mechanisms that operate properly in one type of 
environment but not in another. In such cases, we want to explain the agent’s performance 
in different environments. Transformational analysis is a way of reverse-engineering ones 
own programs. It reduces an agent’s environmental specialization to a series of lemmas 
giving the conditions under which different optimizations are possible. The lemmas are 
often more enlightening than the agents themselves. No one cares what edge detector 
Polly uses. The constraint (given in Lemma 3) which background surface markings 
place on the choice of edge detector is far more interesting. Once the lemmas have been 
obtained, they can be used to predict the performance of old agents in new environments 
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or to suggest designs for new agents in old environments. Given a sufficient stock of 
optimization lemmas, one can imagine developing cookbook methods for designing 
particular kinds of situated agents, much as cookbook methods are currently used in 
electrical and mechanical engineering. 
A discussion of when specialization is appropriate is outside the scope of this paper. 
The issue is not so much whether to build specialized systems or general systems 
as how we can be intelligent consumers of specialization. The literature is full of 
specialized systems, although they are often not billed as such. We must think carefully 
about whether an agent works because of the generality of its design or because of 
serendipitous properties of test data. 
We must study the environment not only formally but experimentally. The knowledge 
we use of the external world to design our agents is necessarily incomplete. I have used 
the transformational techniques discussed here primarily for post-hoc analysis. It is rare 
that I understand the structure of my sensors and environment well enough for my first 
guess at an algorithm be robust. Performing a derivation based on plausible constraints 
that turn out to be empirically false is wasted effort. The environmental constraints 
we encode within our agents are partial theories of the environment. Theories must be 
tested. If we take this notion seriously, then we must view artificial intelligence as a 
form of natural science. To understand intelligence, we must study not only ourselves 
but our world. 
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